The promulgation of the United States’ rebalancing strategy (also known as ‘the Pivot’) to East Asia under Barrack Obama in 2012 heralded a change in the country’s military doctrine in the Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, the doctrine has expanded under Donald Trump to include the Indo-Pacific for the emergence of a loose alliance with Japan, Australia, and India, which has come to be known as the ‘Quadrilateral.’ Despite Russia’s own plans of a ‘pivot’ to East Asia, the country has been remarkably quiet in diplomatic rhetoric towards increased American military presence in the Far East.

While some analysts assert that this is mainly due to the pivot being a balance of power strategy to contain China, there is no doubt that any increased military presence near Russia’s borders warrants a security concern. This research paper asserts that Russia has indeed responded to increased American military presence in the region not through diplomatic or direct military confrontation, but rather through subtle channels of power projection and diplomatic overtures with the United States’ major regional ally—Japan. Firstly, Russia has asserted its regional military dominance via minor incursions near Japan’s airspace and territorial waters taking advantage of Japan’s constitutional limitation which prevents hostile actions. Secondly, Russia has made economic overtures to Japan such as announcing plans to construct natural gas pipelines to supply Honshu. Finally, Russia has announced that it is willing to finally sign a peace treaty with Japan (which has not been signed since the end of the Second World War) and return two of the disputed Kurile Islands. This paper asserts that these three strategies towards Japan decrease the likelihood of Japanese involvement or cooperation with the United States if there are increased military hostilities with Russia.

Keywords: Indo-Pacific, Russia, Japan, Quadrilateral