

DOES DISORGANIZED MASSES ARE THE CAUSES OF PERSISTENT DYNASTIC POLITICS IN DISTRICT KARAK, KP-PAKISTAN.

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ABSTRACT

The present study on “Does Disorganized Masses are the Causes of Persistent Dynastic Politics” was conducted in District Karak, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. The respondents of study comprised of contestants and winners of Provincial and National Assemblies of District Karak in General Election 2013 and the winners of the Local Government Election 2015 of District Karak. Total study population composed of 467 politicians, for which sample size of 196 respondents were proportionally allocated to each respondent’s category and then randomly selected. The conceptual framework of study comprised of dynastic politics (dependent variable) and disorganized masses (independent variables). The data was collected through interview schedule where study variables were measured on likert scale. The data was analyzed by using Uni-variate (frequencies and percentages) and Bi-variate techniques. Chi Square test was used to ascertain associations among study variables. Furthermore, Focus Group Discussion (FGD) technique was applied to collect qualitative data on variables at hand. The Chi Square test for association of independent variables and dependent variable shows that dynastic politics had a significant association with people do not want indulging in political issues ($P=0.035$), people are reluctant to join movements against corrupt politicians ($P=0.014$), bogus polling as common practice ($P=0.025$) and opposition votes were destroyed by using force ($P=0.014$). The study recommended awareness raising of general public and the role of mass media regarding voters responsibilities, bringing reforms in policies and laws related to political parties and election. Furthermore, ensure voters security and establishment of political ethics and discouragement of political posting and transfer of judiciary and bureaucracy.

Keyword: Dynastic Politic, Disorganized Masses, Chi-Square.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Oxford Dictionary (2014) defines “dynasty” as, "A line of hereditary leaders of a nation." Cranston (2016) defines a political dynasty as having no less than four generations successively in the immediate line, chose to state affairs or government office. A dynasty is a process goes down from generation to generation and has been related to government affairs and characterized patrilineally. Inheritance and kinship were primarily seen and legitimately calculated through descent from common inheritor in the male line. In addition, male descended from a dynasty through females have some of the time adopted the name of that political dynasty while asserting its position or legacy. The dynasties, aside from those obtained symbolically like the British Monarchy, have completely vanished from the civilized and developed world because of beginning of democracy. However, such dynasties are strong forces that shape political picture of developing world (Mufti, 2009).

In the study of Political science, there is no standard definition for what constitutes a political dynasty. Hess (2012) defined a dynasty is; a family with no less than four individuals, in a common and similar surname that elected to government office, while Dal Bo et al., (2009) stated that a dynastic official as one who has related with a family that occupied a seat of Congress in past. Clubok et al., (1969) viewed that individual from Congress who was connected as children, grandsons, nephews, siblings or first cousins. Smith (2012) defined a political dynasty that in a dynastic politics, at least two relatives serving in national office. Similarly, Casey (2008) stated that political family as at least two people related by blood or marriage, in a first or second generation, either as a candidate or incumbent at the regional, state or national level politics. These variations and interpretations show that there is no evident meaning of what constitutes a dynastic political tradition. However, there is uncertainty and difficulty between a political family and a dynastic political administration.

However, the definition of Hess (2012) requires no less than four individuals from a similar family and he didn't talk about a multi generational condition, which would in this manner permit a family with a single generation of four relatives and kins in elect office to be called as a dynastic administration. Additionally, Hess (2012) argued that multi generational political ancestry gives a more systematic examination of dynasty, rather than family, through the possible idea of pseudo aristocratic lineage in the appearance of democracy. Cranston (2016)

definition incorporates just those elected relatives in the direct line, i.e. grandfather child grandson, and doesn't include indirect kins and relatives, for example, nieces and nephews, or in-laws. Cranston (2016) excluded and avoids those families where there is a generational break. For instance, the Manning family had four progressive generations chose and elected as a governor and head of South Carolina, but none was in the immediate line; and while the Archer-Chamberlain family had four generations serve in the US Congress, just three were consecutive.

The persistence of political dynasties is varying country to country (Dal Bo et al., 2009). Among developing nations 22 percent of national elected body in India are dynastic and in the Philippines, the share of dynastic legislators in the General Assembly is near 60 percent (Querubin, 2010). There is a major difference in the occurrence of inherent political figures crosswise over developed countries as well. In Japan dynasts represent 20 percent of elected officials (Asako et al., 2015). Pakistan's present agreeing to a national framework of decentralization by eighteenth Amendment (Yang, 2010) has to some degree undermined the fundamental of holding intraparty elections. At the time of constitutional amendment in 2010, there was a constitutional fundamental to hold internal election contest inside political parties. Just independent, honest, powerful and effective commissions can direct the issues of political parties and in the long time take into consideration the development of a less clientelistic method of politics. Also, the court too has an indispensable part to check cases of conflict situation, nepotism, rules violation and general exemption from punishment through which Pakistan powerful political families runs their parties. It is very important that parties expand popular support base outside the boundary of their specific ethnic, clannish pockets or sectarian (Altaf, 2008).

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Mosca (1939) proposed that although elites little in number, but they have the ability to keep control over disorganized masses. In fact masses perceived the dynasts that they are morally superior, strong intellectual history, financially stable, and sound political knowledge. Furthermore, he argued that without accountability systems firmly in place, the perception of general masses regarding their supremacy gives an opportunity to dynastic elites to spread their reign of power and to supersede fundamental norms of appropriate, ethical conduct and behavior. Pareto (1916) included that the non governing elites acknowledges that they don't

have undermine and challenge the rule and supremacy of governing elites. Basically, the classical elite theories believes that dynastic ruler allows political system for the perpetuation of power among heirs and selected family members, who seldom confront vertical and horizontal level accountability checks from the disorganized masses. Election is the one of the democratic tool through which people select representatives to speak for their due rights and protect their interest based on merit; but this concept of voters assume to decide at polling booth based on knowledge regarding candidate. Casey (2008) proposed that either intentionally or unintentionally, voters frequently replace merits for the sack of candidates with superior political background. Crowley and Reece (2013) found that incumbent US governors, who were ineligible to contest future election, made a policy of accountability to voters in favor of their legitimacy and to support their potential future dynastic elites. Although researcher have examined the factors behind dynastic candidate's electoral success, a significant gap was found in literature as to why masses continuously support and elect members of the same family for federal office.

In 2011 Feinstein examine the consequences of voter on dynastic politician, and found that dynastic candidates received average advantage and additionally four percent of the vote during US congressional election. Asako et al., (2015) studied into the implications of dynastic rulers on public policy in Japan and considered the results of political dynasticism, including electoral contest. Though their research study don't make analysis of why voters choose dynastic politicians. Furthermore, they concluded that dynasts have a greater chance of success in election and get a higher vote share than non dynastic politicians. All of this is concerning in a democracy, because as Mills wrote, "As the institutional means of power and the means of communication that tie them together have become steadily more efficient, those now in command of them have come into command of instruments of rule quite unsurpassed in the history of mankind." According to the Shaw and McKay (1942) model, the origin of social disorganization was ethnic and racial heterogeneity, which was thought to obstruct the capability of slum resident to accomplish consensus. Suttles (1968) viewed that mistrust and terror leads to heterogeneity, pushing inhabitants to select associations on the basis of personalistic criteria (for example, sex and age). As a result, the social system becomes segmented of the slum residents due to these protective associations.

Therefore, different ethnic people may share conformist values (decreasing crime), heterogeneity hinders communication and custom of inter action.

A fear of unelected politician and ruling dynasts was the major principle that directed the establishment of democracy in America thus; the Founding Fathers of democratic government ensured its power and spread among many, holding the sovereignty's doctrine of the people. Corbin and Parks (2014) questioned in an egalitarian system, that how democracy could generate an obvious oligarchic decision class, which appears to govern politics in America, while (Dahl, 2006) also suggested that democracy ultimately promote collective institutional conscious rather than individualistic approach. In the study of politics, it is viewed that ruling political elites are capable to perpetuate its supremacy over the disorganized masses, and the political kinship and interruption is one of the oblivious indication of absence of modernity of democratic system.

3. MATERIALS AND METHODS

The purpose of the study was to determine the association of dynastic politics with disorganized masses, electoral fraud, nepotism in candidate selection and incumbency advantages. This chapter presents universe of the study, nature of the respondent, population and sample selection, sampling distribution, method of data collection and data analysis. The methodology of this research is explained as under;

3.1 UNIVERSE OF THE STUDY

To outline perception of respondents towards dynastic politics and its underlying factors, District Karak of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was chosen as the universe for this research activity.

3.2 NATURE OF THE RESPONDENTS

The study population comprised of the people with following characteristics.

- 1) Contestants of National and Provincial Assemblies of District Karak in General Election 2013.
- 2) Winners of the Local Government Election 2015 of District Karak.

The secondary data was collected from Election Commission of Pakistan. A total 63

respondents contested National and Provincial Assemblies election and 404 respondents were elected in Local Government election. The distribution of study population in two strata is given in Table-3.1.

3.3 SAMPLE SIZE AND SAMPLING SELECTION

The study population on the above described criteria is 467 for which a sample size of 196 is required as per Sekaran (2003) criteria. The sample size was proportionally allocated to each stratum (Table-3.1). The distribution of sample size indeed stratum is presented in the Table-3.1. The required sample from each stratum was selected by using lottery method of sample random sampling.

Table 3.1 Distribution of population and sample size

Respondents Category	Total Respondents	Sample Size
Contestants of National and Provincial Assemblies	63	26
Winners of Local Government Election	404	170
Total respondents	467	196

3.4 TOOLS FOR DATA COLLECTION

The research study consisted of four independent variables (Disorganized Masses) and a dependent variable (Dynastic Politics) as given in conceptual framework (Table-3.2). A mix method approach was used in which both qualitative and quantitative data was collected. For collecting quantitative data interview schedule was designed to cover all the study variables as given in the conceptual frame work. The interview schedule was pretested for its reliability and consistency of questions and edited accordingly.

Table 3.2 Conceptual Frame Work

Conceptual Frame Work	
Independent variables	Dependent variable
Disorganized Masses	Dynastic Politics

3.5 FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION (FGD)

Focus Group Discussion (FGD) was conducted to gather qualitative information relating to variables. In this method, a group of 8-10 persons relevant to the topics and had experience was identified for collecting information. The topics for discussion were developed before and a meeting was arranged at a convenient place at the target area. The topics were floated in front of participants for discussion and the researcher recorded the views of participants and put it back to group for correction and confirmation. Framework analysis' (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994) was used to analyze qualitative data.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

4.1 Uni-variate analysis

This section is about the uni-variate analysis of the dependent variable (Dynastic Politics) and independent variable (Disorganized Masses).

4.1.1 Disorganized Masses

Mass disorganization is the failure of members of a society to realize common goals and solve chronic problems. In a society a ruling political elites perpetuate their power over the less organized masses within democracy. Although dynastic politicians are small in number, but capable to keep control over an unorganized majority. Masses recognize the ruling class has an intellectual history, moral dominancy and sound economic status that allows dynasts to maintain their political superiority. Perception of respondents regarding disorganized masses is given in Table-4.1.1 and explained below.

In the results it is indicated that 84.7% respondents viewed that politicians superseded their personal interests to national interest and 13.3% negated this view, while remaining 2.0% were uncertain about it. The politician prefers own profit and give no preference to the interest of masses. To keep their personal interest intact the masses are kept disorganized and unaware of their rights. Furthermore, 54.6% respondents stated that masses have no concern for national political issues, 35.2% respondents opined that politicians paid heed to national political issues, while 10.2% respondents had no idea about it. The result is indicative of fact that general masses have low concerns about

national political issues. The political responses are spontaneous and time bond. It is the politicians that motivate the masses during election in their personal interest. The result is supported by Diamond (2014) that the disengagement of citizen from the electoral procedure is the essential and primary cause of nonfunctional in democracy. The low level of education, income and access to information of masses keep them faraway from political issues and undermine the legitimacy of non dynastic rulers.

The results further show that 62.8% respondents did not want to be indulging in political issues, 30.1% respondents wanted it and the rest 7.1% were uncertain regarding the statement. In addition, majority of the respondents 63.3% perceived that people were reluctant to join movements against corrupt politician but 28.6% respondents negated this view and 8.2% had no comments. It is indicated in the results that people afraid of rising voice against corrupt politicians. The leading role is very important to mobilize and unite masses. Corrupt political figure seems to be a stumbling block in growth and development of a country. The result is supported by Crowley and Reece (2013) that citizens are hesitant to tackle and deal effectively with corrupt political officials. Masses are pressurized to own the fight against such evil and they are stopping by getting involved directly in influencing and shaping anti corruption policy. It is the politicians that oppress public to come together to shape policy and to ensure accountable and transparent government.

Furthermore, 71.9% respondents viewed that politician misguided masses for making wrong choices, 22.4% respondents were against this view and 5.6% were uncertain. Politicians impose their own decisions on masses and not paying attention to local leaders. They mobilize people to do decision in fever of dynasts. Moreover, 53.6% respondents perceived that masses were unaware of the criteria for choosing right candidate for a position, 42.3% refused this view and 4.1% respondents did not know about the statement. The result is supported by Casey (2008) that masses often substitute merit either consciously or unconsciously to support candidates with better political background. Vote is considered as a power of decision making, participating and contributing in governmental matters. Political parties have their eyes on snatching this power from voters and convincing them to increase their vote share.

The Table further explained that 79.6% respondents argued that political affiliation were more important reason to vote than personal qualities of candidates, 15.8% negated this view, while the remaining 4.6% respondents were uncertain. The masses prefer a specific political party to vote rather than candidate based politics that promote dynasties. On the other hand 74.5% respondents view that people were pressurized to vote an apparently ineligible candidate, 23.0% respondents were against this view, while the rest 2.6% respondents were undecided. Political pressure is the major tools to turn the opinion of voters in favor of ineligible candidates. It seems that merit is ignored by the politicians. Asako et al., (2015) concluded that voters are harassed to favor specific political party in electoral process in order to support future dynastic family members. Dynastic politician manipulates election and interfere illegally in an election process to increase vote share of favored candidates and decrease the vote bank of rivals.

The data further shows that 82.7% respondents argued that enthusiastic attachment to political party were more important than fair scrutiny for selection of the candidate, 14.3% were against this view and 3.1% respondents were uncertain. Masses have strong desire and hopped up attachment to political parties and merit is unvalued. The influence of party over-shades personal characteristics of candidates and promote dynasty. Furthermore, 77.0% respondents were fooled but they still did not let their loyalty to a party, 20.4% negated this statement, while 2.6% respondents had not opined. It is concluded that masses give advantage to their parties although they are apparently fooled. The devotion of party workers is playing a pivotal role in politics. Mosca (1939) posits that elites however, little in number can keep up control over unorganized masses in light of the fact that the masses see the ruling class as originating from a bloodline, with a history of intellectuals, financial, or moral superiority.

Table 4.1.1 Frequency and percentage distribution of the respondents regarding their perception of Disorganized Masses

S.No	Disorganized Masses	Yes	No	Uncertain
1	Personal interests supersede national interest?	166(84.7%)	26(13.3%)	4(2.0%)
2	Masses have no concern for nationalpolitical issues?	107(54.6%)	69(35.2%)	20(10.2%)

3	People do not want indulging in political issues?	123(62.8%)	59(30.1%)	14(7.1%)
4	People are reluctant to join movements against corrupt politician?	124(63.3%)	56(28.6%)	16(8.2%)
5	Politician misguides masses for making wrong choices?	141(71.9%)	44(22.4%)	11(5.6%)
6	Masses are unaware of the criteria for choosing right candidate for a position?	105(53.6%)	83(42.3%)	8(4.1%)
7	Political affiliation is more important reason to vote than personal qualities of candidates?	156(79.6%)	31(15.8%)	9(4.6%)
8	People are pressurized to vote an apparently ineligible candidate?	146(74.5%)	45(23.0%)	5(2.6%)
9	Enthusiastic attachment to political party is more important than fair scrutiny for selection of a candidate?	162(82.7%)	28(14.3%)	6(3.1%)
10	People know that they are fooled but they still don't let their loyalty to a party?	151(77.0%)	40(20.4%)	5(2.6%)

*Values in the table present frequency while values in the parenthesis represent percentages proportion of the respondents

4.2 Bi-Variate Analysis

Bi-variate analysis seeks association between dependent variable (Dynastic Politics) and independent variables (Disorganized Masses) were worked out through cross tabulation (chi square test). Discussion on each of the above variable with suitable reason is discussed below.

4.2.1 Association between Dynastic Politics and Disorganized Masses

Well organized and well disciplined community members are important and crucial for political development require high level of political maturity in general masses. Disorganized masses are easy targets for politicians to deceive and actualize their own political interest. For disorganized masses political abilities of candidate become secondary that pave the way for dynastic politics. To ascertain the association between disorganized masses and dynastic politics as given in Table-4.2.1 and explained below.

The results of association between dynastic politics and disorganize masses shows that dynastic politics had a significant association with people do not want

indulging in political issues ($P=0.035$) and people are reluctant to join movements against corrupt politicians ($P=0.014$). Participation in political activities and joining political campaigns have least attracted the people of study area. This probably is because of low political awareness of the masses and their economic instability that don't let masses to join such movements. In addition, family and other social pressure are also significant forces that compel for abstaining from such events. The results are supported by the work laid by Diamond (2014) that the disengagement of people from politics undermines the legitimacy of non dynastic politician. Fear among common masses stops them to unite and stand up for their due rights. They are oppressed to set aside themselves from the sphere of politics.

The result of Casey (2008) shows that masses are replacing merit in favor of candidate with higher political status and common political surname either consciously or unconsciously. Masses still remain ignorant of widespread political issues and public policy generally and it does matter in politics. Similarly, extensive voter ignorance is a kind of pollution of the electoral process. Feintein (2011) reported that at the polling booth citizen choose candidates on the basis of party loyalty; however, voters make decision to protect party interest and ignore merit and national interest and they often

Support differing policies. Voters continuously support same family-name (surname) members during electoral process.

Conversely dynastic politics had a non significant association with masses have no concern for national political issues ($P=0.051$), personal interests of people supersede over national interest ($P=0.468$), masses were unaware of the criteria for choosing right candidate for a position ($P=0.454$) and politician misguides masses for making wrong choices ($P=0.315$). Furthermore, the result also shows that dynastic politics has a non significant association with political affiliation is more important reason to vote than personal qualities of candidates ($P=0.516$), people were pressurized to vote an apparently ineligible candidate ($P=0.274$), people knows that they were fooled but they still don't let their loyalty to a party

($P=0.593$) and enthusiastic attachment to political party were more important than fair scrutiny for selection of a candidate ($P=0.243$).

It is concluded from the above results that disorganized masses plays its role in dynastic politics of a country in two ways. Initially political interests rank very low in their priorities and they don't bother to pay attention to political issues. Secondly despite of profuse political corruption people are reluctant to join movement against these corrupt politicians and consider it as unimportant and futile. This behavior on part of disorganized masses promotes dynastic politics.

Table 4.2.1 Associations between Dynastic Politics and Disorganized Masses

Statements	Attitude	Dynastic Politics		Total	Chi square (X^2) P value
		Yes	No		
People do not want to be Indulge in political issues?	Yes	67 (62.6%)	56 (62.9%)	123(62.8%)	$X^2=6.682$ ($P=.035$)
	No	28 (26.2%)	31 (34.8%)	59 (30.1%)	
	Uncertain	12 (11.2%)	2 (2.2%)	14 (7.1%)	
People are reluctant to join movements against corrupt Politician?	Yes	67 (62.6%)	57 (64.0%)	124(63.3%)	$X^2= 8.511$ ($P=.014$)
	No	26 (24.3%)	30 (33.7%)	56 (28.6%)	
	Uncertain	14 (13.1%)	2 (2.2%)	16 (8.2%)	
Masses have no concern for National political issues?	Yes	54 (50.5%)	53 (59.6%)	107(54.6%)	$X^2=5.969$ ($P=.051$)
	No	37 (34.6%)	32 (36.0%)	69 (35.2%)	
	Uncertain	16 (15.0%)	4 (4.5%)	20 (10.2%)	
Personal interests supersede national interest?	Yes	91 (85.0%)	75 (84.3%)	166(84.7%)	$X^2=1.517$ ($P=.468$)
	No	15 (14.0%)	11 (12.4%)	26 (13.3%)	
	Uncertain	1 (0.9%)	3 (3.4%)	4 (2.0%)	
Masses are unaware of the criteria for choosing right Candidate for a position?	Yes	53 (49.5%)	52 (58.4%)	105(53.6%)	$X^2=1.581$ ($P=.454$)
	No	49 (45.8%)	34 (38.2%)	83 (42.3%)	
	Uncertain	5 (4.7%)	3 (3.4%)	8 (4.1%)	
Politician misguides masses for making wrong choices?	Yes	81 (75.7%)	60 (67.4%)	141(71.9%)	$X^2=2.312$ ($P=.315$)
	No	22 (20.6%)	22 (24.7%)	44 (22.4%)	
	Uncertain	4 (3.7%)	7 (7.9%)	11 (5.6%)	
Political affiliation is more	Yes	88 (82.2%)	68 (76.4%)	156(79.6%)	$X^2=1.324$

important reason to vote than personal qualities of candidates?	No	14 (13.1%)	17 (19.1%)	31 (15.8%)	(P=.516)
	Uncertain	5 (4.7%)	4 (4.5%)	9 (4.6%)	
People are pressurized to vote an apparently ineligible candidate?	Yes	82 (76.6%)	64 (71.9%)	146(74.5%)	$X^2=2.588$ (P=.274)
	No	24 (22.4%)	21 (23.6%)	45 (23.0%)	
	Uncertain	1 (0.9%)	4 (4.5%)	5 (2.6%)	
People know that they are fooled but they still don't let their loyalty to a party?	Yes	85 (79.4%)	66 (74.2%)	151(77.0%)	$X^2=1.046$ (P=.593)
	No	19 (17.8%)	21 (23.6%)	40 (20.4%)	
	Uncertain	3 (2.8%)	2 (2.2%)	5 (2.6%)	
Enthusiastic attachment to political party is more important than fair scrutiny for selection of a candidate?	Yes	84 (78.5%)	78 (87.6%)	162(82.7%)	$X^2=2.831$ (P=.243)
	No	19 (17.8%)	9 (10.1%)	28 (14.3%)	
	Uncertain	4 (3.7%)	2 (2.2%)	6 (3.1%)	

4.3 Results of Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

A focus group discussion (FGD) was conducted in Union Council Teri, district Karak. The meeting was attended by ten participants including six political worker representing different political parties' two religious scholars, one journalist and one Government officials (i.e. Union Council Secretary). The main issues discussed in focus group discussion included, Causes of Persistent Dynastic Politics in DistrictKarak. The results of focus group discussion are given below.

The discussion on the issue is summarized as; Elections are all about gaining control of state patronage. Biradari play a major role in the perpetuation of dynastic politics. The political leadership is passed on in hereditary fashion. The leadership is monopolized for one or two families who do not allow the democracy to take roots in order that they have a free hand to appropriate to themselves the right to rule and loot the national resources to further their political interests in a royal manner. Hereditary politics facilitates access to resources of the state and misappropriation of the state resources makes politicians and their close friends rich and politics a very expensive business which excludes everyone else. In Pakistan the price of politics is very much expensive and dangerous for

ordinary citizen. It includes personal security, bullet proof cars, and access to Police stations; attract press, good reputation among nobles and so on. Having all of the mentioned requirements does not guarantee your victory.

In addition, it is required to pay millions of rupees to the political parties for securing a party ticket to contest election. The women's reserved seats are used by dynasts to keep their wives and daughters busy. The governmental corporations are there to accommodate nephews and cousins; whereas, Senate (upper house) is there to please any one left in the family. Whether the elections are rigged or not, it's impossible to keep the political lords out of the system as the ordinary citizens do not get to participate in the elections. The ground is not even for the majority of Pakistanis and only few families end up ruling the country for eternity.

5. Conclusions

Politics, in study area is believed that this is a status of high power with greater potential to influence general masses; this perception of politics makes it a lucrative position to be occupied by people with lust for power. However, acquiring and maintaining a high status political position is quite tricky and demands lots of maneuvering. The politicians to gain power and retain political power are more inclined to inherit their political status to their family members and other kins in a dynastic fashion. To actualize these desires the masses are kept unaware of political issues and kept indulge in the issues of their daily life to veil the corruption and corrupt practices of the political dynasts. Lack of interest on part of disorganized masses limits the power of political movement to eject political dynasts. Furthermore, the results of election are fraudulently changed or manipulated by bogus polling, destroying opponent votes, use of intimidation to repel opponent voters and established their dynastic rule. Thus the dynasty becomes unavoidable which use their power to introduce their nearer and dearer in high power bureaucratic position which ensures use of these offices for gaining political favors and influencing election results.

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