

New Dimensions of Sino-Pak Relations in the Context of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

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Abstract

The Sino-Pak relationship is a unique case in international politics, while they have different ideologies and cultures. The trusted relations were begun after the border agreement between both countries in 1963. Non-interference policy in each other's internal affairs, win-win policy, common hostility with India on geopolitical disputes, and support for each other at international forums are fundamental factors of their long-lasting friendship. In the 21st century, their relations entered a new phase after the inception of CPEC in April 2015. It's expected that after the completion of CPEC, the relationship will touch new dimensions and is considered ideal in the bilateral relationship's milieu. This research explores the strategic and economic significance of CPEC for both states. Furthermore, investigates the internal and external challenges for CPEC and how to overcome these Challenges.

Keywords: Sino-Pak, Economic Relations, Strategic Relations, Bilateral Trade, KKH, CPEC.

1. Historical Background

Before the Communist Revolution of 1949, China had two political parties (Communist and Nationalist). On October 1, 1949, the Communist Party successes in taking power under the leadership of Mao Zedong, while the Nationalist Party leader Chiang Kai-Shek fled to Taiwan and announced his government. China was divided into two parts, and this dispute is unresolved yet. China was cut off from the world and did not find representation in the United Nations (UN) until 1971 (Yunus, 2015). Pakistan accepted China's status in 1950, but the diplomatic relations started in May 1951. However, most of China's attention was on India, which was improved after October 1954, with Nehru's visit to China, and the slogan "*Indians and Chinese are brothers*" was spread with significant intensity (V. D. Chopra, 1985). In 1954 Pakistan joined SEATO, and CENTO China thought these agreements were against her, but it was soon cleared when both countries' high officials were met at Bandung Conference in 1955.

Pakistan did clarify that it would be neutral, if the Western alliance took any decision against China, like in the Korean War. After that, China adopted a neutrality policy regarding the Kashmir issue (Hafiz, 2015). In October 1956, the Prime Minister (PM) of Pakistan visited China, and the same year in December, the Chinese Premier visited Pakistan, which was the first highly official visit between both countries that was a good sign for new relationships. While two years later, Sino-Pak relations suffered when the Pak-US leadership declared a joint statement against Communism during the visit of the PM of Pakistan to America in 1957 (Sherwani, 1980). The Tibet issue has been increasing distances between India and China since India gave asylum to the leader of the Tibet independent movement and spiritual leader Dalia Lama. Meanwhile, a border issue was raised between the Pak-China when China claimed some disputed areas in Northern Pakistan. Present Ayub Khan immediately deployed Gilgit Scouts on the border for any uncertain situation from China (A. Syed, 1969).

In July 1959, a group of Hajjis from Taiwan met with some religious scholars of Pakistan during their stay in Karachi for a few days and made some statements and speeches. China accused Pakistan of stepping up its following of the US plot to divide China into two parts such as China and Taiwan (Jain, 1981). Ayub Khan (President of Pakistan) put a joint defence plan for India against China on October 1959. However, the Indian PM Nehru rejected it as the Kashmir issue was mentioned to resolve with mutual understanding before cooperation (Bhutto, 1978). Conversely, border clashes increased between India and China in the early sixties. The US desired to use India against China, and the US has given more than \$4 billion in aid to India, however the US has not mentioned any terms and conditions to doesn't use it against Pakistan (Ali, 2003). Pakistan changed its foreign policy like India, one side has benefited from Russia, and another is closer to the US. Pakistan came in favour of China in the UN Security Council to revive China's old status, and China warmly welcomed Pakistan. As such, the bilateral relations were again closed with each other.

2. Pakistan-China Border Agreement March 1963

Although the campaign of Pakistan for China in the UN Security Council gave a new opportunity to come closer to each other yet their amicable relationship was stable after the border agreement between the two countries. The uncertain conditions for both countries lead them to a peaceful border agreement (Brohi, 2015a). China had the most significant fears from the US and Europe to compel Pakistan and India to join the defence against them. However, China is well aware of US ambitions; therefore, China retained the favorable geopolitical position of Pakistan. China also desired to show her dynamic and peaceful behavior toward neighbors (Nepal, Burma, and Pakistan) compared to the Indian antagonistic attitude (A. U. Khan, 2019). On the other side, Pakistan has worse relations with eastern neighbor India and western neighbor Afghanistan. According to this agreement, Pakistan has compromised approximately

5180 sq of land, while China has a concession of 1942 sq (Riedel & Singh, 2010). India raised a hue and cried against China's direct negotiation with Pakistan on Gilgit-Baltistan as part of Kashmir State. According to the constitution of Pakistan, GB is not a constitutional part of Pakistan but a part of the Kashmir Issue (Hussain et al., 2021). The government of Pakistan declared that Gilgit-Baltistan is under the jurisdiction of Pakistan, and it's the responsibility of Pakistan to defend and save it. China-Pakistan agreed on the border agreement till the solution of the disputed region, then the representative of Gilgit-Baltistan reserves the right to confirm the decision or not (Dobell, 1964).

3. Pak-India Wars 1965, 1971 and the Role of China

On September 6, 1965, Pakistan and India began a conventional war. During the war, the US and Europe represented their hybrid policy and entirely banned the delivery of arms to Pakistan and India. While Russia, Europe, and the US fully supported India for weapons delivery in the Sino-India war in 1962 (Palmer & Rubinstein, 1984). China has provided arms to Pakistan in the most highly suffocated situation and threatened India to stop the war. If India does not stop the war, then China will bring its army to the border with India, and later, India will be responsible for all the consequences (Brohi, 2015b). Due to the Chinese threat, the whole world, particularly the US and Russia, was stunned by how China decided to fight with India in a war for the sake of Pakistan's security. The superpowers had to enter the field, and then the India-Pakistan war truce was on September 23, 1965. The two countries signed the agreement in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on a ceasefire (S. Chopra, 1983).

On December 3, 1971, India invaded East Pakistan borders, now Bangladesh. During that time, Pakistan was also facing internal difficulties since April 1971 from Mukti Bahini. Mukti Bahini launched a liberation movement for Bangladesh at the behest of India and started the Civil War. China had given its full support to Pakistan on the UN Forum; however, due to the US and Europeans hypocrisy, India got the chance to occupy Bangladesh, and Pakistan admitted defeat on December 17, 1971. It was the first time China used her veto power against the entry of Bangladesh into the UN security council (Hameed, 2017). China has been highly unprecedented and cooperated with Pakistan in difficult times. Pakistan has always considered China a trustable ally, particularly after the war of 1965 and 1971 (M. Farooq, 2010).

4. Karakoram Highway

Karakoram Highway (KKH) starts from Kashgar, China, and ends in Hasanabdal, Pakistan, with a total length of 1300 km, where 806 km is in Pakistan and 494 km in China. The work was started in 1966 and completed in 1986. During the construction of KKH, 810 Pakistani and 200 Chinese workers died from land slidings (Hielscher, 2018). It is like a jugular vein for the

friendship of China-Pakistan. The KKH has significantly increased the trade and commerce of both states and people-to-people interaction.

5. Sino-Pak Strategic Relations

Pakistan's history witnessed that it has been a victim of wars. During the victims, China did not ensure to adopt a dual policy like the Western world, but fully corporate with Pakistan in every situation. Pakistan has made many defence products; battle tanks, T-59 tanks, Al-Khalid tanks, and many other defense equipment and ammunition with cooperation of China (A. H. Syed, 1974). The Heavy Mechanical complex of Taxila is a key example of their strategic cooperation that cannot be forgotten in the defence sector of Pakistan. The company was given the status of a complex in 1980, with the combination of different industries, which takes place in the armed forces of Pakistan as the backbone of the engineering industry (Siddiq-Agha, 2001). The same company makes the Super Mushtaq MFZ-17, K-8 Jet Trainer, and JF-17 aircraft as the company has developed with China's Aviation Industry. There has been unprecedented cooperation in the air of modernity, the latest in a series of JF-17 Thunder aircraft, which has been a significant achievement for Pakistan (Zeb, 2012). China also cooperated with Pakistan on missile technology in 1986. Pakistan enhances its missile industry through Chinese assistance and building Shaheen, Hatf, Babar, and M-series missiles. These missiles range from 300 to 2000 kilometers (Paul, 2003).

6. Bilateral Economic Cooperation

The Pakistan-China economic relationship was established in 1950. At that time, China needed more markets for its coal, and Pakistan was facing trouble due to the Indian rejection of the coal supply. Both countries agreed on barter trade coal for cotton (Hafiz, 2015). Pak-China strategic relations were started in 1966, while the economic cooperation increased in 1982 with the establishment of the joint committee for trade, economy, and technology. Their trade relations increased when both countries decided to create a comprehensive friendship. At the last end of twenty century, both countries firmly developed a relationship slogan that "*China-Pakistan relationship is higher than the mountain and deeper than oceans,*" as many European thinkers think that Pakistan is like China's Israel (Zeb, 2012). The relationship entered a new phase in the twenty-first century with the Chinese Premier Zhu Rongli visiting Pakistan to attain the 50 anniversary of the relationship on May 11, 2001 and signed many agreements to expand the corporation in different sectors. As a result, in 2002, the trade volume speedily jumped from \$ 1 billion to \$1.8 billion (Shaheen, 2002). In 2006 both countries celebrated 55 years of mutual relationship, which aimed to increase the bilateral relationship and encourage a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Under the agreement, Pakistan announced zero duty on hundreds of items, and China bargained for a 50% tariff on woolen and garments. After the FTA, Pakistan increased

33% of its exports, but China's trade balance remained good (Shabbir, 2017). Pakistan was the second country in the world after the Chile-China FTA. The agreement ensures rapid growth in trade between the Sino-Pak, and trade volume reached \$8.7 billion in 2010. Moreover, around 100 companies are working on many projects in Pakistan (Zaki, 2010). Pakistan's major exports to China are chemicals, seafood, stones, cotton yarn, and cotton fabric. The total export is 70% of cotton items; besides this, Pakistan is also trying to increase its Football and Mango. According to a report, around 4,000 Pakistani traders visit China every month, and many items unavailable in Pakistani markets are imported from there. China deals with its exports to Pakistan in machinery, garments, textile, chemicals, stationery, leather products, and mining (Guruswamy, 2010). On April 20, 2015, China-Pakistan relations entered a new phase when President Xi Jinping visited Pakistan and signed \$46 billion agreements under the project of CPEC. It is a flagship project of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) vision.

Table 01: Hydro projects completed by Chinese companies

#	Name Project	MW
01	Neelum Jhelum Hydro Project	969
02	Ghazi Barotha Hydro Project	1450
03	Mangla Dam Rehabilitation	644
04	Satpara Dam	17
05	Khan Khawar Hydro Project	72
06	Alli Khawar Hydro Project	121

Source: (I. N. Usmani, 2012)

7. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

A country's geopolitical position plays a vital role in the financial, economic, agricultural, and political sectors. Pakistan's geographical location is unique in Asia, where East, West, South, and Central Asia are connected. China planned to benefit from Pakistan's geopolitical location as the world's most rapidly growing economy. Therefore they make an economic venture entitled CPEC, where highway, railway, and energy pipeline systems will permanently connect to each other's (Israr Hussain et al., 2021). Initially, it was worth \$46 billion, and now it has reached \$62 billion after adding a \$16 billion investment. The expected worth of the project will reach \$75 billion (Ebrahim, 2015). The projects of CPEC were divided into three phases, and to monitor these projects working situations, both governments made the Joint Cooperation Committee

(JCC). The projects of CPEC have been divided into four sectors: the energy sector, infrastructure sector, Special Economic Zones (SEZ), and Gwadar Port development. The development process of the projects of CPEC is divided into three phases. The first phase is the early harvest plan from 2015 to 2020, the second is a mid-harvest plan from 2021 to 2025, and the third is a post-harvest plan from 2025 to 2030. Phase one is completed, and work is underway in the second phase. Around 10000 megawatts (MW) of electricity have been generated under the energy projects of CPEC, and thousands of kilometers of roads have been constructed under the infrastructure projects of CPEC. Moreover, several socio-economic projects and the fiber-optic project are already completed. Currently, the construction of SEZs, the development of Gwadar Port, and energy and infrastructure projects are under construction (Hussain et al., 2020).

Projects of CPEC



Table 02: Detail of energy projects under CPEC according to the Ministry of Planning Development and Reform (CPEC, 2019b).

(a) Completed Projects

#	Name Project	MW	Cost in Million	Progress
01	Sahiwal Cole Power Plant	1320	\$1912	100%
02	Port Qasim Cole Power Plant	1320	\$1912	100%
03	Engro Thar Coal Power Plant	660	\$996	100%
04	HUBCO Cole Power Plant	1320	\$1912	100%
05	Matiari-Lahore Transmission Line	660kv	\$1658	100%

06	UEP Wind Farm, Jhimpir, Sindh	100	\$250	100%
07	Gorges II & III Wind Farm Jhimpir, Sindh	100	\$150	100%
08	Dawood Wind Farm, Bhambor Sindh	50	\$112	100%
09	Sachal Wind Farm, Jhimpir, Sindh	50	\$134	100%
19	Karot Hydropower Project	720	\$1720	100%
10	Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park Bahawalpur	400/600	\$520/781	40%
Total Generated Electricity Under CPEC Projects			6040 MW	

(b) Under Constriction Projects

#	Name Project	MW	Cost in Million	Progress
01	SSRL Thar Coal Power Plant I	1320	\$1912	66%
02	HUBCO Thar Coal Power Plant	330	&498	73%
03	HUBCO Nova Thar Coal Power Plant	330	\$498	51%
04	Gwadar Cole Power Plant	300	\$542	20%
05	Suki-Kainari Hydropower Project	870	&2000	70%
06	Kohala Hydropower Project	1124	\$2400	15%
10	Azad Pattan Hydropower Project	700	\$1600	15%
11	Thar Mine Mouth Oracle Power Plant	1320	\$1912	LOI
Total Generated Electricity After completing all Projects under the			6394 MW	

Table 03: Gwadar projects the current working position (CPEC, 2019a).

#	Name Project	Progress
01	Gwadar Free Zone	100%
02	Gwadar Smart Port City Master Plan	100%
03	Pak-China Technical & Vocational Institute	100%

04	Gwadar Eastbay Expressway (19 km, connecting Gwadar Port to Mehran Coastal Highway	100%
05	Gwadar Pak-China Friendship Hospital (300 Bed) Up-gradation	85%
06	Gwadar New International Airport	40%
07	Expansion of Multipurpose Terminal, including Breakwater and Dredging	15%
08	Gwadar Eastbay Expressway II (19 km Eastbay Expressway I to New Gwadar International Airport)	15%
09	Fresh Water Supply Wastewater Treatment Plants for City	15%

Gwadar Port development project is a significant project of CPEC, which consists of several development projects, including Gwadar Smart Port City, Pak-China friendship hospital, Gwadar International Airport, Gwadar Eastbay Expressway, and Pak-China Technical and Vocational Institute.

Infrastructure development is one of the most critical sectors of CPEC, which is a part of Chinese President Xi Jinping's vision of *"One Road, One Belt."* The KKH is extending and renovating for heavy traffics, while the 335 km part from Khunjrab to Raikot Bridge was already reconstructed in 2010. The remaining 472 km was divided into three sections. The first section is from Raikot to Thakot, 279 km, where some parts are completed, and the remaining are under construction. The second part, from Thakot to Havelian, 139 km, is also under construction. The third part is 54 km from Havelian to Hasanabdal. Hazara Motorway was completed in December 2017 (Hielscher, 2018). From Hasanabdal, the route of CPEC is divided into three sub-routes: the Eastern route, the Central route, and the Western route. The Eastern route starts from Hasanabdal to Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan, Sukkur, Hyderabad, and Karachi. Through the Makran Coastal Highway, Karachi has connected with Gwadar Port (Route). The Western route starts from Rawalpindi to Dera Ismail Khan, Quetta, and Gwadar (Route). The Central route starts from Rawalpindi and reaches Jackababad through Dera Ismail Khan. It is divided into two parts on Jackababad; one links the Eastern route on Sukkur to connect Karachi, and the second route is used to direct Gwadar via the M-8 motorway, which is 193 km long out of 892 km was completed in 2016 (Shahzad, 2017, April 29).

Table 04: CPEC infrastructure projects detail (CPEC, 2019a)

#	Name Project	KM	Cost in Million	Progress
01	KKH Phase-II Havelian to Thakot	120	\$1315	100%
03	Peshawar-Karachi Motorway (Lahore-Khanawal) Section)	230	Rs.148.7B	100%
04	Peshawar-Karachi Motorway (Multan-Sukkur) Section)	392	\$2889	100%
05	Peshawar-Karachi Motorway (Hyderabad-Karachi) Section)	136	\$2980	100%
06	Rawalpindi to D.I. Khan M-14	297	\$195	100%
07	Orange Line Metro Train	27	\$1626	100%
Total Constructed New Motorways Under CPEC			1202 KM	

8. Benefits of CPEC for Sino-Pak

8.1. Pakistan

CPEC is a highly beneficial project for Pakistan. This considerable investment will change the internal situation of Pakistan as well as Pakistan put its political and economic influence in the region. Hence, the short description of benefits is followings.

1) Currently, Pakistan is facing around 6000 to 7000 MW electricity shortage, which has great negative impacts on the economy of Pakistan. CPEC will overcome Pakistan's energy shortage. The project has given the highest importance and priority to the energy sector, which includes 17045 MW projects, out of which 6000 MW have been completed, and 6300 MW projects in processing which will be completed by 2025. The other 5000 MW projects are in the pipeline. Thus, Pakistan will not face an energy shortage after 2030, and the economy will grow here rapidly.

2) The railway has a vital role in the transportation of any country. The main thing of the CPEC project is to make Pakistan's railway according to international standards and link to China. Pakistan railway line is 820 km away from Kashgar, China. The new railway line will be built from Havelian, Pakistan, to Kashgar, China, in 2025-2030. According to the rest of the project, the railway's basic infrastructure will be repaired, and some new routes will be built. The project will

reduce the export burden on the highways and increase the country's permanent assets (Guo & Blanchard, 2010).

3) The project connects all parts of the country through motorways. Roads have remained steady for the first time in Pakistan; as a result, the raw materials will be available timely and efficiently for the industries, and there will be development in the remote areas, due to the road connectivity.

4) According to an estimate from the CPEC projects, at least 0.7 million direct jobs will increase and millions of people will get opportunities to enhance their daily income sources. In such a way, unemployment will decrease, and peace and security will prevail in the country, especially in the NWFP and Baluchistan province, due to backwardness and unemployment, which will help to reduce terrorism (Report, October 08, 2015).

5) Pakistan takes many benefits from Gwadar Port; the first will flourish Pakistan's economy, the second is Pakistan Navy will receive its second base, and the third is, Balochistan, the most backward province of Pakistan, will enter a new development.

6) Pakistan will collect billions of dollars in tax revenue annually by connects of road links with Central Asian states. In the near future, the Gwadar port's usage will push up Pakistan's role in regional integration (Iqtidar Hussain, Ke, Bano, Muhammadi, & Hussain, 2019).

8.2 China

This project is not a less significant case for China. It is situated in Pakistan; however, China also has numerous benefits. Due to the CPEC advantages, China may become the first economy in the world in a few years. The notable settlements of CPEC for China are as follows:

1) China has to fix more than 10,000 km distance to reach the Persian Gulf from Shanghai. In contrast, only a 2700 km overland journey from the Western part of China would be fixed to reach the Persian Gulf through the Gwadar Port. Such as a ship takes 45 days to reach the Persian Gulf from the Shanghai coast, while through the route of CPEC, a container will take only 10 days to reach the Persian Gulf from the Western part of China (Ahmad, 2015).

2) China imports 65% of its oil from Malacca Strait, which has always threatened due to several issues. The US has some naval bases in East Asian countries, and China also has a threat from India in the Indian Ocean. CPEC will provide a safest and cheapest route for China to bilateral trade with Middle Eastern states.

3) Through CPEC, China can save \$ 2 billion annually in the nearest way and also a good sign for air pollution due to less oil consumption for transportation (Safdar, 2015).

4) China will ease its energy resources, particularly the gas pipeline via Pakistan, to import oil and gas pipelines from Iran. The CPEC will provide a suitable option for China to reach Africa and Europe by land via Iran.

5) China could bring rapid development to the Western part. The Western part is less developed as compared to the Eastern part. CPEC is the best link for this land lock region to access Gwadar Port. It will be easier to lay the net industries, deliver raw materials, and import exports (M. Khan, 2017).

9. Challenges for CPEC

CPEC has various threats, and the Pakistan government should suitably tackle them; otherwise, it will be a high risk for the projects. The major threats in the way of CPEC are the following.

9.1 Security Issues

Pakistan's security issues are major hurdles in the way of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) since 9/11. After the 9/11 incident, Pakistan decides to provide full support to the US against the insurgent groups. Pakistan has faced suicide attacks since 2003, which are continuing, and more than 80000 people have lost their lives. Pakistan had, directly and indirectly, a \$ 130 billion economic loss during the last 17 years (A. U. Khan, 2019). In 2015, the National Assembly of Pakistan passed a National Action Plan (NAP) to eliminate terrorism and its sources. Pakistan Army launched an operation against terrorism under the title of Zarb-e-Azb. In this operation, the army killed over 3,500 terrorists and executed more than 110 by special military courts, and 490 soldiers were martyred. Through the NAP, the wave of terrorism substantially decreased to 56% in attacks, 48% dead, and 57% injuries compared to 2003-2014 (Gul & Abdullah, 2015). However, Pakistan's security forces are still unsuccessful in eliminating all routes of terrorism while the second Army operation, Rudd-ul-Fasad, was started in 2017. However, although security forces have successfully overcome the major threats, they have not been successful in eliminating terrorist activities. In this context, during the last three years, several attacks on the Chinese to sabotage the CPEC. Certainly, it will be a big challenge to complete the remaining projects of CPEC. Pakistan should ensure the security of the Chinese workers to strengthen trust-building.

9.2 Pakistan's Internal Differences

Bureaucracy has played a crucial and unique role in Pakistan, where many projects have faced severe problems in terms of success or failure. Amin claimed that several corruption complaints and cases had been registered against the bureaucracy of Pakistan. The CPEC has many issues, including lacking correct information about terms and conditions, reporting corruption on many projects, and neglecting national causes. That is why the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) government failed to show all terms and conditions of CPEC (Amin, 2014). Conversely, provincial differences within Pakistan lost many valuable projects based on these differences. Pakistan's other three provinces and Gilgit-Baltistan has objections to Punjab's dominance in bureaucracy, army, and parliament due to its 56% population advantage. Therefore, there is a lack of political stability and maturity. The same concerns have been with CPEC, where KPK and Baluchistan provinces are urging the first construction of the Western Route. The KPK and Baluchistan provinces have strong reservations about the central government delaying Western Route and neglecting their provinces on CPEC projects (Adeney, 2015). Both countries' policymakers must take precise measures to cover all misconceptions about CPEC.

9.3 Gilgit-Baltistan

Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) is an administrative part of Pakistan; however, it is not constitutionally part of Pakistan. GB's geostrategic location is critical to achieving the objectives of CPEC because, without GB, China cannot directly access to Pakistan. India claimed GB is a part of Kashmir, and Pakistan illegally possesses the GB. The Indian foreign office released many statements against the route of CPEC that passes through the GB (Israr Hussain, Lihong, Hussain, & Qambari, 2020). On May 15, 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China and strongly objected to the route of CPEC via GB; however, China rejected the Indian objection (Chandran, 2017). This is a fact that Pakistan should be given a reasonable constitutional status to GB. However, due to the Pakistani bureaucracy's hypocritical behavior towards GB and the dread of Indian reaction, Pakistan hesitates to take a solid decision regarding the constitutional integration of GB in Pakistan or categorically declare a disputed status. On the other side, the local people of GB also have strong reservations about their status. They want constitutional rights from Pakistan. After mid of 2014, the rights movement increased when the federal government imposed new taxes and withdrew previous subsidies. As a result, a new organization, "*Awami Action Comity (ACC)*," was established with the participation of 23 different religious, political, and nationalist parties with a new slogan "*No Taxations without Representation*." The government of Pakistan withdraws its decisions after a

mass protest against taxes (U. Farooq, 2014). The new alarming situation for Pakistan was created in 2018 when Prime Minister of Pakistan Shahid Khaqan Abbasi visited Gilgit to announce the new administrative order 2018 for GB. The people of GB got a strike against this decision. Even some assembly members tore the paper in front of the PM, raising the slogan we strongly condemn the Pakistani parliament order and viceroy of Pakistan's visit. They walk out of the session except the government benches members of Pakistan Muslim League(N) (Ghulam, 2018). The youth of GB also actively participate in their constitutional rights. Many seminars and conferences were arranged in the different cities of Pakistan to give more awareness among the citizens. Thus, further prolonged colonial behavior like the last 75 years may be uncomfortably lost for Pakistan. Pakistan should ensure the constitutional and political representation of the people of GB in the national assembly and senate of Pakistan.

9.4 External Challenges for CPEC

CPEC will enhance the Sino-Pak economy, trade, and mutual relations. But some regional and international powers thought it as threatened their interests; therefore, they engaged in conspiracies. The countries include at the top of the list; are India, and the US. These countries fear the risk of losses from these projects and have some reservations. India has strong reservations on Kashmir, GB, and water disputes with Pakistan, and both countries consider each other as a rival from the beginning. As well as India also borders conflicts with China. India considers the Sino-Pak friendship as a big challenge for its dominancy in Asia. India viewed the GB as a part of Kashmir and Pakistan having illegal possession over it, and the CPEC is the passes through the Gilgit-Baltistan. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's strong objection to CPEC via Gilgit-Baltistan during his visit to China at G-20 Summit in September 2016 (Nazir, 2016). Although the US initially didn't openly come against CPEC however, in October 2017, the ex defense secretary of the US, James Mattis gave his statement against CPEC for crossing the disputed land (Gilgit-Baltistan) between India and Pakistan. He issued his opinion in front of the "Senate Armed Services Committee," which was the first American highly official statement against CPEC. At the same time, US aggression can be more exposed in the near future (Iqbal, 2017). Afghanistan had an old rivalry with Pakistan due to past issues, especially after 9/11, the pro-American Afghan government against Pakistan by her supportive role for the Taliban. However, after the fall of Kabul in 2021, Pak-Afghan relations developed as friendly neighboring countries. The Indians tried to develop a good relationship with Afghanistan to achieve its strategic and economic goals. (Butt & Butt, 2015).

10. Conclusion

Pakistan was the first Islamic and third non-communist country to recognize the People's Republic of China on January 4, 1950, while both countries experienced some ups and downs

on the diplomatic front in the era of 1950s. Pak-China relations entered a flawless face after the border agreement in 1963. The relationship was further strengthened when China fully supported Pakistan in the Indo-Pak War of 1965. After 1971 Pakistan's dismemberment, China supplied more equipment and technology to improve Pakistan's defence and used her first veto power in the UNSC against Bangladesh. On the other side, Pakistan has helped China restore its status in the UNSC by giving it access to air space and dealing with the US. In the 1960s, their strategic relations were more dominant than economic ones. Economic relations increased in the 90s; however, significant changes occurred from 2000 to 2015 compared to the past. Sino-Pak economic relations were further deepened due to the inception of CPEC in April 2015. CPEC is a game-changer project for both states, and many scholars view it's a gold mine for Pakistan's development. CPEC has been a gigantic economic venture in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) since the independence of Pakistan. Now at the end of CPEC Phase-I, Pakistan's current situation in the energy sector has increased above 6000 MW, and in the infrastructure sector Eastern Route, most projects have been completed, which has a good sign for Pakistan's economy. According to the government of Pakistan, CPEC provided above 75000 direct jobs, while in the end, 07 million direct and indirect jobs will be created. Pakistan could enjoy the geostrategic, and geo-economics benefits of Gwadar Port.

Pakistan enjoyed CPEC benefits while it wasn't complete, although, after the completion of the corridor and development of the Gwadar Port, China can enjoy many tremendous paybacks. It's the shortest and safest route to access the Middle East for Chinese exports and Imports. China can save \$2 billion annually in transportation within a short distance. Conversely, it's the best opportunity to link the Western landlock region to access the Gwadar Port. Pakistan has faced some internal and external challenges regarding the CPEC. The provincial disparities, security issues, and constitutional status of GB are internal hurdles, as well as the Indian hostility and the US conspiracies against the Sino-Pak, which are remarkable external threads on the way of CPEC.

Recommendations

(1) Terrorism is one of the major hurdles in the way of CPEC; however, with the passage of time, the security forces of Pakistan have successfully reduced the terrorist attacks due to the two major army operations. Resultantly, above 3500 terrorists have been killed. Although it's still a big challenge for Pakistan's peace and development, the government of Pakistan should promptly act on the National Action Plan (NAP) without any internal and external pressures.

(2) Pakistan's political misleading, red tap bureaucracy, and inequitable behavior with small provinces are serious issues for CPEC. Pakistan should take solid measures to solve the issues and reservations as soon as possible.

(3) The constitutional status of Gilgit-Baltistan could be a gigantic peril for CPEC. In this regard, Pakistan must solve the constitutional status of GB, while the past practices have been terrible in solving this issue. The constitutional status of GB will help to eliminate all external power conspiracies against the CPEC.

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